||31 Oct 1967
||31 Jul 1968
||30 Apr 1969
||31 Jan 1970
||31 Oct 1970
||31 Jan 1968
||31 Oct 1968
||31 Jul 1969
||30 Apr 1970
||30 Apr 1971
||30 Apr 1968
||31 Jan 1969
||31 Oct 1969
||31 Jul 1970
||31 Oct 1971
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
8TH BATTALION (175MM/8 INCH) (SP), 4TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96269
5 February 1969
|SUBJECT:||Operational Report of 8th Battalion (175MM/8 Inch) (SP) 4th Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65)(R-1)(U)|
1. Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.
a. (U) General(1) The 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery arrived in the Republic of Vietnam on 12 August 1967. The battalion has been continuously engaged in combat operations since 15 August 1967.
(2) This is the sixth Operational Report submitted by this organization.
(3) Organization Chart (See inclosure 1).
b. Historical Data(1) Deployment and status of the 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery and its subordinate elements at the beginning of the reporting period ( 1 November 68) were as follows:
UNIT LOCATION MISSION AND STATUS 8/4 Arty (-) GS XXIV CORPS REIN 12TH MARINE REGT HHB/8/4 Arty YD223587 (Dong Ha) SVC/8/4 Arty YD223587 (Dong Ha) A/8/4Arty YD210674 (Fire Support Base C-l) C/8/4 Arty YD231589 (Dong Ha) B/8/4 Arty 1st Plt/B/8/4 AT985719
(Da Nang Hill 34)
2nd Plt/B/8/4 AT876574
(Da Nang Hill 65)
GS 1ST MARINE DIVISION OPCON 11TH MARINE REGT
(2) On 1 November 1968 Battery A was completely non-operational for 23 minutes from 0702 to 0725 due to deadline of guns.
(3) On 1 November 68 at 1145 hours received official notification that all fires into the DMZ would cease at 2100 hours.
(4) On 1 November the Dong Ha Combat Base area received incoming enemy artillery on 4 separate occasions: 0855 hours, 1132 hours, 1306 hours and 2107 hours. No damage or casualties in the battalion.
(5) On 2 and 3 November no rounds were fired by either Battery A or C except for registration.
(6) On 9 November at 1800 hours Battery A at Fire Support Base C-1 (YD210674) received approximately 25 rounds of enemy 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 4 minor WIA and light damage to six vehicles. Combat operations were not affected.
(7) On 9 November at 1800 hours Battery B received one sniper round (small arms) at Da Nang Hill 34 (AT985719). One minor WIA resulted to a perimeter guard. No other action occurred.
(8) On November Battery C was converted from 175mm guns to 8-inch howitzers. The first gun was ready for action and fired on this date. All guns were retubed and operational by I8 November.
(9) On 19 November Battery B moved the two guns of the 2nd Plt back to Da Nang (AT985719) No change in mission.
(10) On 24 November Battery C displaced to Fire Support Base C-2 (YD1164) to support 3d Marine Division recon elements in the southern portion of the DMZ. incoming enemy mortar fire was received within 3 hours after the battery closed the new area. There were no casualties.
(11) On 9 December Battery A displaced from Fire Support Base C-1 (YD210674) to Dong Ha Combat Base (YD231589) and occupied temporary firing positions.
(12) On 10 December Battery A displaced from Dong He Combat Base to Fire Support Base Elliott (Rockpile-XD9854) to support operations of the 3d Marine Division.
(13) On 10 December Battery B displaced 2 guns from Da Nang (Hill 34-AT985719) to An Hoa (AT8647) to support, Operation Taylor Common by, the 1st Marine Division.
(14) On 10 December Battery A incurred one fatality from a vehicle accident st Fire Support Base Elliott (Rockpile-XD9854).
(15) On 20 December at 1415 hours at Fire. Support Base C-2 (YD1164) the Battalion Commander, LTC Harry W. Brown, fired the 50,000th round fired by Battery C since arrival in country. Surveillance indicated an enemy bunker destroyed. (16) On 19 January 69 Major Curtis F. Hoglan assumed command of the battalion from LTC Harry W. Brown.
(17) Between 19 and 27 January the battalion minus Battery B received CMMI inspection from the XXIV Corps CMMI inspection team.
(18) On 28 January LTC Frank M. Kulik Jr. assumed command of the battalion from Major Curtis F. Hoglan.
(19) Missions and rounds fired during the reporting period.
A/8/4 459 msn
B/8/4 388 msn
C/8/4 142 msn
Total 689 msn
(20) The cumulative total rounds fired by this battalion since arrival in country through 312400H January is 149,355.
c. (U) Training: The battalion conducted n toto1 of 132 hours of scheduled training or all personnel. In addition, special training programs were conducted for FDC personnel and for cross training within sections.
d. Observation: The two battalion air observers during the reporting period fleer in support of the 12th Marine Regiment and 108th Artillery Group. Air observers control fires of artillery end naval gunfire. The battalion provides one ground forward observer and radio telephone operator to the Mai Loc Special Forces area of operation on a semi-permanent basis.
e. (U) Logistics: Average daily deadline rates for the reporting period.
ITEM PERCENT SP Arty 175MM and 8-Inch 34.26% Other Tracked Vehicles 32.2% Wheeled Vehicles 10.9% FADAC Generators 18.6%
f. (U) Civic Action: The battalion was active in a number of projects during the reporting period.(1) Quang Tri National Prisons Assisting in the rehabilitation of approximately 350 former Viet Cong. Scrap materials are donated to be used in making furniture, kerosene stoves, and household articles.
(2) Two (2) MEDCAPS at Gio Ha and Dong Luong: Initiated during September and August 1968 respectively and treated a total of 2256 patients of which 1287 were during this reporting period.
(3) The Bao Loc School project in Ha Thank Village was suspended on 9 Dec 68 when Battery A displaced from Fire Support Base C-1 (YD210674).
g. Personnel and Administration:(1) Strength at end of period (31 Jan 69):
AUTH ASG OFF 37 35 WO 6 6 ENL 522 511 TOTAL 565 522
(2) Significant Shortages:
MOS TITLE AUTH ASG
31 Jan 69
13Z50 E-8 Opn Sgt. 1 0 13B40 E-6 Chief of Section 16 7 13E40 E-6 FDC CMPT 3 3 13E40 E-5 Recon Sgt 6 1 71T20 E-4 TAERS Clk 5 2 76S20 E-4 PLL Clk 5
(3) Casualties: Four minor WIA in Battery A from enemy mortar and one minor WIA in Battery B from a sniper round. One killed not as a result of hostile action in Battery A.
2. Section 2 Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations:
a. (U) Personnel: None
b. Operations(1) Splitting the firing elements of heavy artillery batteries.(a) OBSERVATION: It is not desirable to split the firing elements of a battery.
(b) EVALUATION: Battery B has been required to operate from from separate firing positions for almost the entire period of this report. Initially the positions were close enough to allow a single fire direction center to control a11 the fires, however a later move separated the firing platoons to such an extent as to require operation of two complete fire direction centers. In addition the requirements for increased communications, maintenance and transportation of ammunition severely overloaded the battery.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that when an over riding requirement exists for operating a battery from separate positions the supported or re-inforced unit be taxed for support in the form of additional personnel, communications equipment, and transportation.
(2) Fabrication of temporary gun pads for heavy artillery.(a) OBSERVATION: A requirement exists for fabrication of temporary gun pads for heavy artillery Pieces for use upon initial occupation of position.
(b) EVALUATION: This unit has experienced numerous difficulties in employment of the 175MM and 8-Inch (SP) weapons due to the nature of the local ground conditions. Even a small amount of rain causes the bearing capacity of the soil to decrease thereby resulting in the gun becoming mired to the extent as to make it extremely difficult to fire. In one unit a wood platform was constructed of 3 inch thick lumber and 3 feet engineer stakes. A sketch of this pad is attached is inclosure 2. This pad has served surprisingly well for a period of approximately one month.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That heavy units he issued a reserve stock of lumber suitable for such pads and that such pads be built for use as soon as possible after occupation of position.
c. Training: None
d. Intelligence: None
e. Logistics: None
f. Organization: None
g. Survival Escape and Evasion: Negative Report
h. Other: None
FRANK M. KULIK JR. LTC., FA Commanding 2 mcI DISTRIBUTION: 2 - CINCOSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT 3 - CGUSARV, ATTN: AVHGC (DST) 4 - CGXXIV, ATTN: AVII-GCT 5 - HQ. 8th Bn, 4th Arty, ATTN: S3 7 - CO, 108th Arty Gp. ATTN: AVGL-C