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8th Battalion 4th Artillery Events and History Significant to the Battalion 1969 |
1969/01/19 Unit: BN Source: 8/4 Op Rpt Location: Dong Ha Event: Maj Curtis F. Hoglan assumes command (16) On 19 January 69 Major Curtis F. Hoglan assumed command of the battalion from LTC. Harry W. Brown. 1969/01/20 1969/01/22 This 1st Marine Division operation sent the reinforced 9th Marines into the northern end of the A Shau Valley and claimed 1,335 known enemy casualties. The Marines perseverance was rewarded with some of the largest caches captured during the war. Over 525 tons of weapons and ammunition were uncovered, including 12 large 122mm cannons - the first ever seen inside South Vietnam. 1969/01/22 This was the USMC search and destroy operation that followed DAWSON RIVER WEST in western I Corps and was folded into DEWEY CANYON. It reopened several 1968 FSBs: Henderson on the 18th, Tun Tavern on the 20th, and Shiloh on the 21st leading toward the Song Da Krong Valley which is south of Vandegrift Combat Base and north of the A Shau Valley. 1969/01/27 1969/01/28 (18) On 28 January LTC. Frank M. Kulik Jr. assumed command of the battalion from Major Curtis F. Hoglan. 1969/01/31 f. (U) Civic Action: The battalion was active in a number of projects during the reporting period. (1) Quang Tri National Prisons Assisting in the rehabilitation of approximately 350 former Viet Cong. Scrap materials are donated to be used in making furniture, kerosene stoves, and household articles. (2) Two (2) MEDCAPS at Gio Ha and Dong Luong: Initiated during September and August 1968 respectively and treated a total of 2256 patients of which 1287 were during this reporting period. (3) The Bao Loc School project in Ha Thank Village was suspended on 9 Dec 68 when Battery A displaced from Fire Support Base C-1 (YD210674). 1969/01/31 d. Observation: The two battalion air observers during the reporting period fleer in support of the 12th Marine Regiment and 108th Artillery Group. Air observers control fires of artillery end naval gunfire. The battalion provides one ground forward observer and radio telephone operator to the Mai Loc Special Forces area of operation on a semi-permanent basis. 1969/02/01 Bravo's Gun 1 and Gun 2 were at An Hoa when Tet arrived in 1969. Nothing happened until Tet was officially over, then all hell broke loose! The first night, VC sappers sneaked in under the cover of a barrage of mortar fire and blew up the ammo dump. In the next couple of days the constant rocket and mortar attacks finally hit our gun and put it out of commission. We were down to 50 rounds between us, so we moved all our ammo down to Gun 2. The siege went on for about 15 days and everyone got a little crazy. Snoopy worked out every night between us and the guys at Freedom Bridge. Sometimes Snoopy would be so close with the fire that everything turned red and you couldn't hear yourself scream, no matter how loud you tried. No Dust Off's could make it in and the one chopper that I remember seeing got shot down right behind the guns in that empty field. They tried to re-supply us and the C-130 that had the ammo got shot up and crashed landed on the runway. I can still remember seeing the plane make its turn and come in right over the guns with smoke pouring off the wing -- lots of crackling and popping, but it did land, and after a very heroic effort the Marines managed to get the fire out and nothing blew up! 1969/02/01 I was the BN radio and FADAC mechanic a Spc 5 with HHB and I made the rounds to the various batteries for repairs when necessary. This of course meant traveling by jeep or truck in Marine convoys. On one occasion an emergency dictated me using a OH-6 to get me and my electronic test equipment to the Rockpile ASAP. But, the day in question was by jeep. One day during the rainy season early in 1969, the BN CO (Ltc. Harry W. Brown or 15-Feb-69, Ltc. Frank M. Kulick, Jr) calls for me and my jeep to saddle up and prepare to drive west on RT 9 to deliver 3 new boot LT's 1 or 2 to the battery at C-2, and the other to the battery at the Rockpile. So, here we are 2 jeeps driving west with the BN CO in the lead with his driver and one of the new LT's and myself driving with another guy from commo and 2 new LT's in the rear seat. It had been agreed upon between myself and the other commo guy before we left Dong Ha to do what we could to frighten the new LT's. So, as we are leaving the BN area I am telling the LT's that more than likely we will be ambushed and shot at along the way, that they be prepared to use their M-16s but, keep the safety on, as I didn't want to get shot in the back of the head by a trembling new boot. We are just about to drive by the village at Cam Lo when unfortunately, my left rear tire goes flat. I then pull off into the village and notice that there is a Marine grunt company on a break with their packs off and resting all around us. I then call the BN CO who is by now about a 1/4 mile up the road and explain my predicament. He says that he'll wait where he is while I am changing out the flat tire. As I am getting ready to pull off my spare tire a lone Marine 2 ½ Ton truck goes by with 2 in the cab and another in the back on a .50 caliber. Now things get even worse, my spare tire is also flat. So, I call the BN CO again and explain the new predicament I am in. He tells me to drive with the flat tire up the road to meet up with him and he gives permission to use the spare tire off of his shinny new, BN CO jeep. Oh, oh, this is not a good thing! While changing out the flat tire with the new one from the BN CO's jeep (this was a difficult thing to do with all the mud, rain coming down and being on the side of a hill) we are hearing automatic weapons fire in the near distance on the other side of the little hill. At the same time while changing the flat, that Marine company went running by us with full packs on heading towards the gunfire. We finally, got under way topped the hill and started down on the other side driving past all those grunts running until we came to the head of the company and their CO who was telling our BN CO not to go any further west as it was too dangerous. He was telling our CO that there was an ambush under way up the next hill and around a corner with some Marines in a lone truck. What to do? There is no way a Marine captain is going tell an Army field grade officer what to do, after all we are the Army! So, we continue on with the mission driving ever closer to the increasing sounds of that firefight up the hill and around the corner with the banks on both sides of the road getting higher and higher above the road (a perfect spot for an ambush). All of a sudden there comes a jeep with about 4 Green Berets screaming around the corner slipping and sliding and coming to a stop next to our CO and emphatically stating no way Jose' don't go any further. As far as they could tell driving by the Marine truck at high speed was that all 3 Marines looked like they were dead. So, here it is from the mouth of one of our own, an Army Green Beret saying don't do it. So, the BN CO orders us to return to Dong Ha and try it another day. On our way back that Marine grunt company is still running towards the firefight in hopes of helping. Back at BN we are all relieved to have lived another day. The new boot LT's are really hyper alert with big eyes and most definitely glad to be back safe. Rumor has it BN is wondering what to do with me, since I left the motor pool without fully checking out my jeep? But, at the same time maybe they ought to give me a medal for having a flat tire at the right time that saved our lives and that of the BN CO? It was decided that I should get a company grade article 15 which did cost me $50.00. So, much for my life saving work that day in early 1969, when a getting flat tire was a good thing indeed. P.S. Would you like to hear about my exploits on my 2nd year in Nam when I flew as a scout on a OH-6A with the 1st Cav (B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cav) in III Corps on the Cambodian border. Oh, yes please give me more cross border ops, I am a glutton for adventure. A couple more DFC's, PH's would just fine. NOT! 1969/02/20 8/4 assigned to XXIV Corps. Provisional Corps Vietnam was originally formed 10-Mar-68. On 15-Aug-68 it was redesignated XXIV Corps. 1969/02/23 1969/02/24 Also see 'Fifteen Days of Hell at An Hoa' by Scott Stevenson. During this time at An Hoa an ammo dump is blown - 175 Gun damaged - 175mm ammo shortage - a helicopter shot down - C130 seriously damaged. 1969/02/25 (4) On 25 February Battery A at Fire Support Base Elliott (XD982544) received approximately 15 hostile 120mm rockets on three separate occasions: 0440 hours, 1140 hours, and 1640 hours. Casualties and property damage were four WIA's, minor damage to three vehicles and a 30 KW generator combat loss. 1969/02/25 (5) On 25 February at 2235 hours two reconnaissance sergeants at Mai Loc Special Forces Camp (YD5209) from Batteries A and B were WIA during a hostile 82mm mortar attack on that position. 1969/03/01 Oklahoma Hills was the most important multi- battalion operation for the 7th Marines during the spring of 1969. All units of the organization plus the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines participated in the effort southwest of Da Nang. The operation was physically exhausting for the average infantryman. The rough, frequently slippery jungle terrain made it hard to maneuver. When the operation was terminated on 29 May, an estimated 600 NVA had been killed and a massive network of NVA installations had been destroyed. 1969/03/06 (7) on 6 March Battery B displaced two guns from An Hoa (AT8747) to Da Nang Hill 34 (AT985719) in preparation for the battery's move to Dong Ha Combat Base. 1969/03/07 (8) on 7 March Battery B displaced from Da Nang Hill 34 (AT985719) via boat enroute to Dong Ha Combat Base. 1969/03/08 (10) On 8 March Battery B closed at Dong Ha Combat Base (YD231589) and assumed its parent unit mission supporting the 3rd Marine Division. 1969/03/10 (12) On 10 March Battery C at Fire Support Base C-2 (YD132641) received several hostile 122mm rockets resulting in one minor WIA. Combat operations were not affected. 1969/03/10 (11) On 10 March Battery B displaced from Dong Ha Combat Base (YD231589) to Fire Support Base Ca Lu (YD013449) to support an Operation conducted by the 3rd Marine Division. The battery mission remained the same. (B Btry was in position to support the 2/3 Marines in Operation Maine Crag. Editor) 1969/03/11 (13) On ll March Battery B at Fire Support Base Ca Lu (YD013449) incurred two minor injuries from a fragmentation grenade which exploded while burning the perimeter around their position. Injuries were not as a result of hostile action. 1969/03/15 A sign posted by the Marines reads: "Dear Charlie, Know ye that 2nd Bn 3rd Marines with 3 under strength rifle Co. did this to you. H Company was here. When your stomachs ache from hunger, when you mourn your dead and your ammo runs dry, Think of us. We did it to you and will continue to do so. 2/3 Marines" 1969/03/15 On March 16, 1969, the 1st Brigade, 5th Inf Div (Mech) was again committed in the 3rd Marine Regiment's AO. It operated an Armor/infantry Task Force named Task Force Remagen to re-open the RC (Route Coloniale) 9 to the Laotian border, to conduct reconnaissance in the Khe Sanh plain, and support the 3rd Marine regiment's Operation Maine Crag. For three days, between 12 and 16 April, the Brigade conducted a search and clear operation over a 100-square kilometer area near Lang Vei on the Laotian border. No US were killed and North Vietnamese Army casualties were also light. 1969/03/17 (14) On 17 March at 1400 hours the battalion ammunition convoy proceeding to Fire Support Base Elliott (XD982544) was ambushed with small arms, automatic weapons and mortars at YD063573. There were no personnel injuries or damage to vehicles. 1969/03/18 (15) On 18 March at 1430 hours the battalion maintenance section enroute to Fire Support Base Ca Lu (YD013449) received hostile small arms and materials between YD061569 and YD036563 with no personnel injuries or vehicular damage. 1969/03/19 (16) On 19 March the battalion ammunition convoy was again ambushed with small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars at YD060568 and YD072572 respectively while proceeding to and from Fire Support Base Ca Lu (YD013449). No friendly casualties, minor vehicular damage, and two enemy KIA's resulted from the two ambushes. Multiple enemy ambushes have been predominate between YD077571 and YD036563 since 15 March I969. 1969/03/25 (17) On 25 March at 1715 hours Battery B displaced from Fire Support Base Ca Lu (YD013449) to Dong Ha Combat Base (YD231589). No change in mission. 1969/03/26 In support of MONTANA MAULER, the 1/11th Inf, 1st BRIGADE, 5th Inf Div became involved in a sweltering fight against well-defended NVA trench networks and bunker complexes. Eventually the entire 3/5th Cav came to reinforce elements of the 1/11th plus one battalion from the 2d ARVN Regt. The stubborn NVA repeatedly counterattacks newly taken positions despite a generous application of supporting arms. 1969/04/01 In the spring of 1969, 1/61 was part of JTF Guadalcanal, precursing Operation Utah Mesa, with units of the 3rd Marine Division in the western portion of the AO. The 1st BN 61st Infantry, with Alfa Company 1st BN 77th Armor attached, was directed to conduct operations in the vicinity of Khe Sanh village. An ARVN unit had made heavy contact in that area and 1/61 moved by armored vehicles to join the fight. The BN moved west and after three days of heavy fighting the NVA broke contact. During this operation the BN assisted in the relief of LRRP Team Elk River which had been surrounded by the NVA. Total losses were 4 KIA US (2 from 1/77 and 2 from 1/61) while there were 36 NVA bodies recovered. The BN also combat lost 3 M113s and 1 M48 tank and destroyed (and buried) them on site. Some units of the 1/61 parked their tracks and became airmobile. Inserted in the rugged terrain near the ROCKPILE these troops conducted dismounted search and destroy operations for eight days. By the end of April 1969 all 1/61 units had returned to their eastern fire bases. 1969/04/01 1969/04/07 1969/04/12 (18) On 12 April Battery B displaced from Dong Ha Combat Base (YD231589) to Fire Support Base C-1 (YD210674). Mission remained the same. 1969/04/12 On 17 May, B Battery commander Capt. O'Neil left the battery, having finished his tour. He was replaced by Capt. Carstinson (sp?). 1969/04/13 (19) On 13 April at approximately 0500 hours the C Battery forward observer working with the 2nd ARVN Regiment at LZ Torch was wounded in action when their position was temporarily overrun by an undetermined number of NVA soldiers. 1969/04/15 Cpt Raymond T. Roe assumes command from Cpt Tommy Youmans. Cpt Alvie L. "Al" Fulton followed Cpt Roe. 1969/04/15 Attached are 9 pictures from A Btry on the Rock Pile (firebase Elliot) in late 1968 and 1969 time frame before I moved the battery to Camp JJ Carroll. To be accurate, no artillery was ever located on the Rock Pile. Rock Pile was a cliff like mountain located a couple 1000 meters directly to the North of Fire Support Base Elliot. Because of Fire Support Base Elliot's close proximity to the Rock Pile, a major geographic landmark, fire base Elliot was affectionately called by who served there as "Rock Pile". Fire base Elliot was actually just to the South of Rock Pile on a plateau. The firebase was split in two by Highway 9 as it meandered toward Vandergriff, Ca Lu and the abandoned Khe Sanh Combat Base. The See Bees worked day and night to black top QL 9 in early to mid 69. Just after ribbon cutting Vandergriff was abandoned and the road was destroyed. Soon after Rock Pile suffered the same fate. According Col. Lee and Col. Cartwright of the 108th Artillery group during late 68 and 69 A Btry at the Rock Pile fired the heaviest volume and had the best readiness rate in the 108th Artillery Group. At that time Rock Pile was co-occupied by a USMC M109 Btry, a platoon from 5th 8" and 5th guns whom initially were "Long Toms" and later became 6 gun 175mm Btry. These were the very same 175mm guns and not 8th of the 4th who participated on site in the 1st and 2nd artillery raids. The fact is the 8th of the 4th planned and technically commanded the artillery raids, but had no tubes forward at the raid sites. Before the artillery raids Rock Pile was also the departure point for numerous platoons to company size USMC grunt operations/patrols that were initially lifted out by those old ancient helicopters that resembled giant "grass hopper" as shown in the Rock Pile pictures. Later the USMC used CH-46s the downsized version of the Army CH-47 and/or the "Jolly Green Giants". There was also a USMC "grunt" company rotated in and out for perimeter security. Perimeter security was helped out by 1st of the 44th dusters, Quad 50s and a section or two of searchlights. At times we even observed the initial pilot runs of the TV survival series in that at least once a month we had to disrupt a "John Wayne movie" in the mess hall to watch some dumb NVA fire into the perimeter on his way up to the top of the Rock Pile to visit the Radio Relay station. Of course I do not blame the NVA/VC from being annoyed it was a tough climb to the shear cliff top and the searchlights, dusters/Quad 50 fires crisscrossing the mountainside simply ruined their day and their expectation of a long and prosperous life. As the rock climbers took on the dusters and Quad 50s in vain well beyond the effective range of the NVA/VC small arms it became an excellent fire power display. As it was we could safely sit on the bunkers, drink beer (small quantities) and watch the tracers and at times close support aircraft do their magic. If it were not for the first class view of this and other local area firefights, being rocketed, watching the "Cobras" and "Spooky Work" out and/or U.S. mail being dropped on LBJ and Razorback by F4s our life might have been quiet boring. Humping ammo, maintaining the guns, filling thousands of sand bags and retubing from 175 to 8" or back to 175 every other week would have been quite boring without the routine fire works between Charlie, the USMC, and the RVNs north of the Rock Pile. One should not forget Charlie also entertained us close up and personal if not daily at least periodically right about chow time. As time permits, I will relay a funny story about routine shelling around chow time, a three-hole latrine, a young over excited soldier and the USM Jolly Green Giant chopper. At any rate the Group and General Pixson (the 24th Corps Arty Commander) liked us and several times the Corp Arty Co. flew a couple hours just to bring us ice cream. We never did dare nor wanted to tell him that we had hard ice cream and not just warm mush in the ice box compliments of LTC Kulick, later LTC Smith and the sticky fingers of the Bn S4. The S4 was either German or Dutch ancestry who, regardless of what has been claimed was undoubtedly the greatest barterer and five finger acquisitioner in the 8th of the 4th's history. Having said that, what kept us from letting on about the ice cream was that General Pixson cared and wanted us to know we were not forgotten -- the thought meant a lot to us even if the ice cream did not. Sgt. Baker's #4 Gun Section. The best trained and most knowledgeable gun section I ever saw. Conveniently we built the helipad for visitors next to his gun. As you all know the mark of a good gun crew/gun is speed and accuracy. In A Btry it was a sin if the gun crew did not have his spade dug in before the XO could hit the aiming circle. Same as previous the ICON gun #4, LBJ, Razorback, and Rock Pile. #4 is laid East to fire on Bn HQ in case they shorted us on ice cream, pop, steak or beer. #4 firing East & Rock Pile in the background. The relay station and about 100 feet of shear cliff at top right obscured by smoke. Center is #3 Gun. To the left is #4 gun quarters and closest is the #3 gun quarters. On left #4 Gun next to it the Ammo Dump and from left to right, LBJ, Razorback and Rock Pile. LBJ and Razorback were full of caves. Rock Pile on the East was a relay station/look outpost. The NVA routinely fired at the RVN and US forces by moving their tubes/rockets in and out of the caves. The profile of the left mountain nearly resembles the profile of President Johnson. Rock Pile Sheridan the XO Post and USMC Choppers ready to left the USMC infantry out on patrol. Short of the XO tower is the commo bunker. Picture #8 shows the completed bunker. The Btry Ammo Dump with 1/44th on the perimeter facing the Rock Pile. The duster bunker is center along perimeter. Picture of the Commo bunker, generator, maintenance, etc. A Btry Motor Pool and the remarkably beautiful green hills to the west. Over the tent is the powder burning area. May want to enlarge the picture to get a good view of the hills. Saint Barbara, the Patriot Saint of the Artillery. As I recall one night we fired change 1 and 2 all night next day we had enough powder to fill a 2 1/2 T truck and a 3/4 T Truck and trailer. The young LT (AXO/FDO) thought he would start a bond fire by piling it several feet high over a significant area. He failed to inform anyone, after all burning powder is a routine job. The problem became the fireball that resembled an "A Bomb" and sent all scrambling. Even at a thousand feet or more the heat was shocking. The fact is, we in A Btry enjoyed firing all day and all night. Getting high damage assessment or a few KIAs made our day. But we did observe Sundays. Sunday after police call we normally had all you could eat steak, free beer and pop. Of course a day did not go by without Top telling the XO and I about the "good ole days". As to Sundays only the ready crews were prohibited from partaking of alcohol. We had fun but if you showed up for duty having taken the privilege to excess an Article 15 waited, no ifs, ands or buts. Fortunately the learning curve was minute and we all quickly came to a definite understanding as to how things were to work. A Btry was one of several of my combat commands from 68-72. I worked North (DMZ) and South (along Cambodian Border) but I have never again met an equally high quality energetic and talented group as I saw on the Rock Pile in 1968 and 1969. Actually the same statement equally applies to the quality folks of the 8th Bn 4th Artillery. As to A Btry's #1, #2 and #3 Guns who were admittedly neglected in the picture -- There should not be any doubt that they were great folks and great gun crews. I would take them over any other guns crew I later saw or had experience with. The bottom line, in every group there has to be a so-called "best" but in A Btry only a razors edge separated the best from the rest. For those who have persevered and read this note, I also have several pictures from the 1st two artillery raids that I shall provide later as I get them out of boxes. To Big Al, Ron Naples and Major Prisk I have pictures of you also. For Harold, the Arty Mechanic, I have several stories where artillery mechanics put themselves at high risk to keep the guns going and several stories about generators, generator parts and 2 ea. 40-Ft. trailers of float ASL (DS/GS level repair parts), which conveniently appeared or disappeared as needed. It may be interesting to note that the BN maintenance operation became so elaborate that at times the DS/GS forward maintenance detachment traded their next incoming spare parts requisition for items maintained in the BN's unauthorized ASL. Yes our operation was unconventional but we shared all parts with the 2nd of the 94th, the USMC 8 inchers and guns. We cross-trained our best mechanics with the DS/GS forward detachment in their forward facility and thus our folks frequently repaired the guns of the 2nd of the 94th using parts from our unauthorized ASL. We pushed the envelope but made sure no tubes were down because we hoarded or had unauthorized parts. Our old crusty maintenance warrant and motor sergeant (Chief Tidwell and Sgt. Smallwood) built a maintenance shop that could handle three guns and had maintenance pits. The 8th of the 4th did not lack in repair skills either the Bn maintenance section was knowledgeable and skilled to refurbish an 8" or 175MM minus the mount and fuel injectors. With two wreckers the Bn maintenance team could pull and replace a tube and cannon in 15 to 18 minutes which was 30% faster than was the best time of the maintenance detachment whose function was tube/cannon assembly replacement. Even the fuel injectors were not a problem, we had a cooperative/bartering agreement with the Marines and Sea Bees. I have a picture of the Captain (S4 in 68) who I believe was the greatest barterer I have ever known. I will try to put in writing the stories of him acquiring 2 ea. 100 KW generators, 100s of tons of building materials and other unauthorized but needed equipment, etc. I hope someone based on the picture will provide the name of the person and as the information unfolds may even agree with me that he was most likely the greatest barterer in 8th of the 4th. To the Vietnam War period music lovers. I like the idea of songs from the past in fact I have several of the songs you mentioned. As "Private Andrew Malone" my brother bought a corvette while I bought a 66 GTO convertible with factory air, which I just had refurbished. The car looks great. Only a few convertibles in 66 had factory air. The only reason I kept the car all these years is because it was my very first car and my wife loved the old "muscle cars". I am also glad that unlike Andrew Malone in the song my two brothers and I who served concurrently in Vietnam from 68-72 all made it back. One of my brothers was shot down several times and was shipped home, shortly after I returned state side in Mar 1972. Following, sometime later he was medically discharged with 100% disability. To the music, the Vietnam era music was great and probably pleases us "old horses" if played loud and accompanied by the greats -- Jim Beam, Johnny Walker and Jack Daniels, etc. However, after an hour or so the ladies may object to getting down and reliving our previous lives. To Ronald Suden of the USMC early to mid 69 the USMC in the DMZ received the new 175mm guns to replace the old "Long Toms". In fact the USMC probably had the newest guns in the DMZ. The 8th of the 4th and 2nd of the 94th received new or rebuilt guns as they "shot out the chassis" and/or lost a gun to combat loses. The new USMC 175s and their tough gun crews were one of the reasons that in the first two arty raids, we were able to shoot over three thousand plus rounds in a matter of days. As to 175mm guns, advancement in the 8" arena and the introduction of MLRS made the 175mm obsolete. The 8" survived longer because it had a reliable nuclear round but computer projections even in the mid 70s made both the 8" and 175mm unsurvivable on the future battlefield. The fact is, we needed systems that could "shoot and scoot" and thus survive dedicated "Warsaw Pact" counterfire. Using the Bradley Vehicle chassis/armament, an on board computer and the now somewhat antiquated GPS -- MLRS became the ideal general support weapon system of the 80s, 90s and for sometime in the future with the aid of numerous new product improvements. In the late 70s (1976-1978) I worked the testing and training issues of the newly emerging MLRS. As is, the 175mm gun, the best at the time has gone the same way as you and I. Bela Csendes, A Btry 8/4th (68,69,70), HHC 2/94th (68) 1969/04/22 (20) On 22 April the B Battery forward observer with the 2nd ARVN Regiment northwest of Fire Support Base C-2 (YD132641) received 2nd and 3rd degree burns over 35% of his body, and his RTO received 2nd degree burns over 18% of his body, when a in which they were riding was hit by a hostile RPG while landing at grid YDO13643. 1969/04/27 (21) On 27 April at 1130 hours, a 1/4 ton truck, property of Service Battery, flipped after hitting a mine hole at YD070571. One personnel received minor injuries. 1969/04/30 f. (U) Civic Action: The battalion was active in the following projects during the reporting period: (1) Three (3) MEDCAPS at Dong Luong, An Lac, and Dong Ha City: Initiated during August, November 1968 and March 1969 respectively. During the reporting period a total of 1757 patients, of which 60% were children, were treated. Most significant cases encountered were 60 plague cases at the children's hospital in Dong Ha City. In addition to treating patients, the MEDCAPS include distributing clothing soap for washing, candy, and ice cream to the Vietnamese people. Battery B will conduct a MEDCAP starting in May at either Ha Thank or Gig Ha Village. A thorough report will be included in next quarter's ORLL. (2) Quang Tri National Prison: Assisting in the rehabilitation of approximately 350 former Viet Cong. Scrap materials are donated to be used in making furniture, kerosene stoves, and household articles. Upon receipt of information from GS 3rd Marine Division, it was determined that further assistance to the Quang Tri National Prison was unnecessary. The project was terminated during March 1969. (3) The Bao Loc School project in Ha Thank Village was reinstated toward the end of April by Battery B presently located at Fire Support Base C-1 (YD210674), Materials will be furnished to assist in constructing a high school and finish the dispensary now in progress. 1969/04/31 d. (C) Observation: The battalion aerial observers through 1 March flew in support of the 12th Marine Regiment and 108th Artillery Group. On 1 March the aerial observers were assigned to 108th Artillery Group while continuing to control the fires of artillery and naval guns into and along the DMZ. The battalion provided during this reporting period six ground observers and radio telephone operators to the l01st Air Cavalry Division, 5th Mechanized Division, Mai Loc Special Forces, and the 2nd ARVN Regiment to support combat operations in their responsible areas of operation. Of the ground observers committed, two were wounded in action and medivaced while one became ill and was medivaced to Phu Bai for treatment and observation. 1969/05/01 Cpt Robert A. Veen assumes command. 1969/05/01 Cpt. Robert A. Veen assumes command. 1969/05/01 9th & 3d USMC, Quang Tri, ends 7-16, 560 EKIA 1969/05/10 1969/05/11 101st Airborne Division, Ap Bia; Forty-six men of the 101st Airborne die during a fierce ten-day battle at 'Hamburger Hill' in the A Shau Valley near Hue. 400 others are wounded. After the hill is taken, the troops are then ordered to abandon it by their commander. NVA then move in and take back the hill unopposed. The costly assault and its confused aftermath provokes a political outcry back in the U.S. that American lives are being wasted in Vietnam. One Senator labels the assault "senseless and irresponsible." It is the beginning of the end for America in Vietnam as Washington now orders MACV Commander Gen. Creighton Abrams to avoid such encounters in the future. 'Hamburger Hill' is the last major search and destroy mission by U.S. troops during the war. Small unit actions will now be used instead. A long period of decline in morale and discipline begins among American draftees serving in Vietnam involuntarily. Drug usage becomes rampant as nearly 50 percent experiment with marijuana, opium, or heroin which are easy to obtain on the streets of Saigon. U.S. military hospitals later become deluged with drug related cases as drug abuse causalities far outnumber causalities of war. 1969/05/16 1969/05/17 Cpt Carstinson(sp) assumes command from Cpt Brian M. O'Neill 1969/05/20 (2) On 20 May 1969 a vehicle from Service Battery returning from Quang Tri Combat Base (YD303541) to Dong Ha Combat Base (YD223587), received one round of sniper fire. The round struck a passenger on the head, penetrating both the steel pot and the helmet liner, and rendered the individual unconscious. The soldiers was treated for a headache and kept under observation by the Battalion Surgeon for the remainder of the day. 1969/05/26 1969/05/27 (3) On 27 May 1969, Battery B incurred one fatality from the explosion fragmentation grenade. The accident occurred while the individual was on perimeter guard and was not as a result of hostile action. 1969/05/27 1969/06/01 1969/06/01 Using the LZ as a center, the units of the TF began to conduct heavy patrols in the area. The NVA, recognizing the danger to their supply lines, quickly reacted. On successive nights the NVA made strong attacks on LZ Saigon. In both cases the attacks were beaten off with heavy losses to the NVA. Well developed fire plans, tanks firing flachette rounds and preplanned indirect fires took an awful toll on the attacking NVA troops. 1969/06/05 1969/06/09 1969/06/12 1969/06/16 It was 16 June 1969. For weeks before the attack, the enemy had been probing our fire base's perimeter, though B Battery's inner compound remained secure. Night after night ARVN and US Marine snipers, high above FSB Charlie One in observation towers, pecked away at those eerie, translucent green-grey shadows which moved silently across the big lenses of their starlight scopes. Occasionally, when teams of the enemy were picked up on experimental antipersonnel radar deployed at C-1, an ARVN mortar team would lay down fire to discourage them. On the night of the attack, what turned out to be an NVA sapper company was seen approaching by the radar. An ARVN 105mm battery on C-1's northern outer perimeter set minimum safe time on their fuses and began firing directly into sapper ranks. We were told later that NVA mortar teams were supposed to have covered their comrades' assault but had mistaken the 105mm muzzle blasts and the close-in air bursts for detonating sapper charges so, ironically, they held back so as not to bring fire on their own troops. The sappers were caught in the open. They had nowhere to run because the perimeter was sewn with old French and new American antipersonnel mines and could only be traversed safely with great care. When the ARVN artillery opened fire, they just hunkered down and took it. They also faced withering fire from the light and heavy machine guns of the ARVN armored cavalry unit that had just been resupplied and deployed on C-1's outer perimeter that afternoon. An hour or so after the opening shots were fired, a Marine Corps OV-10 Bronco observation aircraft began rocket and strafing runs low over their positions, just outside C-1's outer perimeter. Our role and the role of the US 3rd Marine 155mm howitzer gunners positioned just south of us at C-1 was passive. We couldn't fire over the heads of the ARVN at such close range and, in any case, the berms of our gun pits would not have allowed us to lower our tubes enough to be effective. Our gun crews secured the guns and ammo bunkers and the rest of us stayed atop our underground bunkers, not in them, to give us height advantage if the sappers broke through our inner perimeter. They did not. The shooting began to fade at dawn. The few sappers still out there and alive took advantage of the coming light to make their retreat through the mines. But the light also afforded the Marine and ARVN snipers the opportunity to pick them off. Some were shot as they fled; others lost limbs and lives to the mines. As the morning progressed, the full extent of what had happened during the night became clear. There were bodies everywhere. A 100 meters from our inner perimeter gate an NVA soldier's torso hung headless and limbless in the concertina wire. Near the fire base's front gate, the sapper company commander, a captain, sat in the mine field defiantly waving an automatic pistol at ARVN and American soldiers who hoped to coax him into surrendering so they could retrieve from him valuable intelligence. He had lost both legs below the knees to a mine blast. His stumps and head wounds were bandaged. There were tourniquets around both his thighs. He wouldn't throw down his weapon and after an hour or so took his own life with shot through the roof of the mouth. The body count was in by mid-day after hours of picking through the mine fields. Some bodies were dragged clear with grappling hooks suspended from long cables lowered from helicopters. There were 67 in all, stacked up along the road that ran between Highway 1 and C-1's front gate. There were no ARVN or American casualties as far as we knew. We learned later that NVA intelligence had failed to pick up the deployment on our perimeter that day of the newly resupplied ARVN armored cavalry unit whose heavy weapons, along with the 105s of the ARVN artillery unit, laid down an impenetrable field of fire. We were thankful for that uncharacteristic oversight. 1969/06/17 (4) On 17 June 1969, Fire Support Base C-1 (YD210674) received a ground attack from an estimated three companies of NVA. The perimeter security force (2nd Bn, 2nd ARVN Regt) successfully defended the position inflicting 58 enemy KIA confirmed. Battery B suffered no casualties or equipment damage and combat operations were not affected. 1969/06/30 1969/07/16 (6) On 16 July the Battery A forward observer with the 3rd ARVN Regt received slight shrapnel wounds to the head when their position at grid YDQ333957 came under mortar attack. 1969/07/20 What were you walking in/on when Neil Armstrong became the first person to walk on the Moon? 1969/07/21 1969/07/31 d. Observations: During this reporting period the Battalion provided nine forward observer teams to ground forces in northern I Corps. These teams, consisting of a forward observer and a radio telephone operator, were provided to the Mai Loc Special Forces, RF/PF forces, ARVN Forces to support combat operations in their areas of operation. 1969/07/31 f. Civic Action: The battalion was active in the following projects during the reporting period. (1) Four MEDCAPS at Dong Luong, An Lac, Dong He City, and Ha Thank are being conducted. These MEDCAPS were initiated in August and November 1968 and March and May, 1969 respectively. During the reporting period a total of 2695 patients, of which approximately 70% were children, were treated. In addition to treating patients, the MEDCAPS include distribution of clothing, soap, candy, and ice cream to the Vietnamese people. (2) Bao Loc Civic Action Project: Battery B located at Fire Support Base C-1 (YD210674) is providing assistance end material for the construction of a dispensary and high school located in Ha Thank village. During the reporting period the roof covering the dispensary was completed and construction was begun on the high school. 1969/07/31 (11) During the reporting period the Battalion destroyed 375 bunkers and was credited with 39 enemy KIA confirmed. 1969/08/08 (2) On 8 August 1969 Battery B incurred 2 KIA and 10 WIA when an enemy 122MM rocket landed approximately 10 meters from the Unit mess hall at approximately 0710 hours. 1969/08/08 1969/08/08 1969/08/11 (3) On 11 August 1969 LTC. Isaac D. Smith assumed command of the Battalion from LTC. Frank M. Kulik, Jr. 1969/08/22 (5) On 22 August 1969 at YD185588, the Battery C commander received light sniper fire. No casualties or equipment damage were suffered. (6) On 24 August 1969 at YD133627, a Battery C convoy received light sniper fire. No casualties or equipment damage were suffered. 1969/09/02 (8) On 2 September 1969 Battery C incurred one WIA NBC who accidentally shot himself while cleaning a .45 caliber pistol. 1969/09/02 (7) On 2 September 1969 this battalion and all its units were hit by Typhoon Dora from 0800-1500 hours. There was extensive equipment and building damage, but no personnel injuries. 1969/09/30 (10) On 30 September 1969 Battery A retubed from 175MM to 8 inch. 1969/10/01 Shortly before we moved to Carroll in, I think it was Nov-69, a hydrogen filled weather balloon, a big one, exploded on me in the inflation shelter as I was tying it off at the inflation nozzle. I was burned left face/left arm. Because I was bent down tying off the balloon, most of the explosive force went over me, probably saving my life. It was a big boom. The inflation shelter was shredded. The little hooch-like em club emptied out, people thinking we had been hit with some kind of large incoming round. It was an evening flight we were preparing the balloon for. I was carried by jeep to the aid station, examined by a doctor, given pain medicine then carried to a chopper pad and medivacd to the hospital ship sanctuary where I stayed for a week before returning to Dong Ha. In my absence our metro section moved to Carroll. I followed a day or 2 later. I have a permanent scar on my left elbow as a souvenir of that event. I will never forget the RAWIN system----zone winds, ballistic winds, pressure density chart, timer recorder, the GMD, and god forgive me the machine I liked to work best but can't remember it's name the chart where we plotted temp lapse rates, humidity and barometric pressure. 1969/10/11 (11) On 11 October 1969 Battery C displaced from C-2 to A-4 at YD11896989 without incident. :Roger Schmidt road marched from C-2 to A-4 in 1969 1969/10/20 (12) On 20 October 1969 Battery A displaced from Elliot Combat Base to Camp Carroll at YD06205450 without incident. ;This is the "reopened" Camp Carroll. 1969/10/31 (20) During the reporting period, the battalion destroyed 179 bunkers and was credited with 23 enemy KIA confirmed. 1969/10/31 (15) On 31 October 1969 Battery A displaced one platoon to the west at YD03185629 to support a l01st Airmobile Division operation. Ninety-five rounds were fired with a surveillance of 17 bunkers destroyed and one damaged. The platoon returned to the battery position before nightfall. 1969/10/31 d. Observation: During this reporting period, this battalion provided four forward observer teams to ground forces in Northern I Corps. These teams, consisting of a forward observer and a radio telephone operator, were provided to the 2nd ARVN Regiment, 3rd ARVN Regiment, l0lst Airmobile Division, and 3/5th Cavalry squadron. 1969/11/01 Cpt Donald Peacock assumes command. 1969/11/01 1969/11/01 (3) On 1 November 68 at 1145 hours received official notification that all fires into the DMZ would cease at 2100 hours. 1969/11/08 Near miss of 8" howitzer. Powder pit destroyed. No injuries 1969/11/08 (2) On 8 November 1969 Battery A sustained damages due to a rocket attack which included holes in recoil cover plate and valve covers and M-37 burned off one Ml10 howitzer, 44 white bag propellent charges, 56 flash reducers, and 15 M564 time fuses destroyed. 1969/11/08 I remember once when we were receiving incoming at Carroll, while we were still living in tents and praying in the"ready trenches", our section leader Lt. John Lohr telling us that during the incoming , Capt. Roe was running around looking for 122 mm rocket craters in order to get a azimuth reading to where the NVA were firing the rockets from. Allegedly the radar section was having equipment problems and according to Lt. Lohr, Capt. Roe was carrying, I swear to our maker, a boiled egg or eggs in his pocket to roll down into the rocket crater and when the egg would come to rest, the narrow end of the egg would point in the direction from which the rockets came. I didn't dream this, I swear to heaven, and remember it clearly from a relatively early morning romp to the "ready trench" during one of the sweet little visits of the screaming 122's. Does anyone else recall hearing about this egg trick with 122mm rocket craters? 1969/11/10 I have been reading a lot lately on the site and have been enjoying every minute. I was in C battery Jan 69 to Jan 70. I recall very good when the 5th mech arrived. They said that they had just come up from down south and they said it would be R&R for them up North. As I recall they were "dead wrong". They set up a perimeter with a company of NVA right in the middle. I was the gunner of gun 2 and as I recall we fired a mission that may have never gone on the books, because it was too close to our own troops. If it wasn't for the 8/4 they would have taken an even worse ass kicking than they did. We had an excellent FO and FDC They called down for gun 2 , 1 round H.E.. They said we better get it right. As I recall the next command was the same only it was battery 90 rounds. The mission lasted all night and into the next morning .We blew the hell out of most of our gun pad buildings from the concussion and had to rebuild them when we got the chance. 1969/11/11 During the month of Nov the BN (now Task Force 161 {TF} with D Company 1/11 Infantry and A Company 1/77 Armor attached.) made heavy contact with the 27th NVA REGT. After three days and two nights of close combat the NVA positions were overrun and the 27th REGT effectively eliminated for combat use. 2 DSC's awarded. 1969/11/11 Earlier I mentioned that there were two or three times that we retubed a couple of gun sections at Carroll to participate in support of the 5th Mech sweep north of Cam Lo, West of A4, East of the Rock Pile and South of the DMZ. I think it was hill 161 or some combination of those numbers. I haven't read the George McLean book, however, during my time, there were a total of eight guns at Carroll, 4 Army and 4 Marine. (Court Prisk) 1969/11/13 (3) On 12 November 1969 a new metro site was opened for occupation at Camp Carroll for use by the metro section, 8/4 Arty. (4) On 13 November 1969, metro section, 8/4 Arty displaced to Camp Carroll to continue operations from that location. 1969/11/15 1969/11/15 (5) On 15 November 1969 at YD598195, CO, A Battery received sniper fire. There were no casualties or equipment damage. (6) On 20 November 1969 at YD150587 A Battery CO's driver received sniper fire. There were no casualties or equipment damage. 1969/12/01 1969/12/07 1969/12/13 (7) On 13 December 1969, Battery B displaced from FSB C-1 to FSB C-2 at YD132641 without incident. 1969/12/14 (8) On 14 December 1969 a briefing was presented to the CO, 108th Group concerning the newly developed ARVN heavy artillery training program designed to train an ARVN cadre. (9) On 17 December 1969 a decision briefing was conducted for the CO, XXIV Corps Arty, on the above ARVN training program. The program is presently under consideration. (16) On 19 January 1970 this unit received information that it would be responsible for the conduct of XXIV Corps Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Schools commencing in February 1970. 1969/12/24 (10) On 24 December 1969 this unit began a Christmas cease fire at 1800 hours. The cease fire terminated 251800 December 1969 without incident. (12) On 31 December 1969 a New Year's cease fire began at 1800 hours. The cease fire terminated at 011800 January 1970 without incident. 1969/12/28 (11) On 28 December 1969 Task Force Smith conducted a heavy artillery raid in the vicinity of Elliot Combat Base. The raid was terminated at 291200 December 1969. Operation was highly successful; OPORD and after-action reports have been submitted to higher headquarters. |