Operating Reports
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APO 96269

1 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

TO: See Distribution


1. (U) General.

a. Predeployment Activities

(1) The 8th.Battalion (175mm) (SP) 4th Artillery, was activated at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on 15 March 1967 by General Orders Number 25, Headquarters, U. S. Army Artillery and Missile Center, dated 31 January 1967.

(2) The battalion was organized under TO&E 6-455D (See Inclosure 1) less an organic aviation section, and augmented by a meteorological section, a liaison section, and 6 forward observer sections.

(3) A formal 8-week Intensified Combat Training Period (ICTP) was initiated on 17 April 1967. Training progressed on schedule and was successfully terminated with a Battalion Training Test administered by the 1st Field Artillery Brigade on 8-9 June 1967.

b. Movement Overseas.

(1) preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) began on 12 June 1967 and was completed without difficulty and well within the allotted time period.

(2) Equipment was shipped from Fort Sill according to the following schedule:

General cargoAll vehicular equipment  
89 Conex containers
15283July 1967
Red Disk TAT 12  Conex containers
87 Conex inserts
4814 July 1967
Advance party52 Conex inserts
156-7 August 1967

(3) The main body of the battalion departed Fort Sill by air on 24 July 1967 and subsequently sailed from Tacoma, Washington, a--board the USMS General Upshur on 25 July 1967. Orders were received enroute changing the unit's port of debarkation in the Republic of Vietnam from Qui Nhon to Da Nang.

(4) An advance Party of 27 personnel departed Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma City, aboard two C-130 aircraft an 6 and 7 August respectively.

c. Arrival In-Country

(1) The two elements of the advance party arrived at the Air Force Freight Terminal at Da Nang on 9 and 10 August, respectively. The main body arrived on 12 August and disembarked at Red Beach northwest of Da Nang.

(2) The battalion Staff worked directly with Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force to arrange for troop billeting, rations, and movement of the battalion to unloading of personnel and equipment, its assigned areas of operations. At the request of the Battalion Commander, Da Nang Sub-Area Command provided a secured equipment staging area near the port facilities.

(3) The bulk of the general cargo, which arrived 10 August, was unloaded at the deep water pier northeast of Da Nang and moved to a battalion staging area southwest of the City. Tracked vehicles were off-loaded onto LCU's and transferred to the bridge ramp pier in Da Nang. Unloading operations were completed by 12 August. The processing and rearrangement of equipment into a tactical configuration was completed on 15 August.

(4) B Battery was placed under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division. The battery moved into position 4 kilometers west of Red Beach and began firing on 15 August.

(5) The remainder of the battalion was placed under the operational control of the 3rd Marine Division and moved by sea and overland convoy to Dong Ha, 18 kilometers south of the Demilitarized Zone. The firing elements of A and C Batteries were in position and firing on 17 August. All elements of the battalion were in position by 18 August.

2. Intelligence.

a. Weather and terrain (see Inclosure 2).

(1) Throughout August and the first half of September, the weather in the Dong Ha area was generally hot and dry with winds from the west and southwest. During the latter half of September and throughout October the winds came generally from the east bringing slightly cooler temperatures and a sharp increase in precipitation. Severe rains, with 18 inches recorded during one 3-day period (16-18 September), hindered normal operations and caused gun emplacements to deteriorate rapidly. Severe erosion of gun positions coupled with deep mud made it extremely difficult to maintain stable firing positions.

(2) B Battery has experienced predominantly hot, dry weather with the occasional violent thunderstorms prevalent in the Da Nang area. The soil, prettily sand has provided an excellent surface for gun positions but the high water table (approximately 2 feet below the surface) precluded construction of underground facilities in the area.

b. Observation

(1) The six forward observer sections assigned to the battalion have seen only limited use as such. They have been used primarily to augment battalion and battery Fire Direction teams. On two occasions, forward observer parties accompanied ARVN units during operations in the coastal area north of the Cua Viet River and east of Route 1.

(2) Flying conditions have been generally favorable for aerial observation during the reporting period. Air has been the primary means for observing fire missions and registrations, although aerial observation has been limited on occasions by a shortage, of aircraft.

c. Metro.

(1) The battalion meteorological section has performed with exceptional efficiency and has experienced no significant problems to date.

(2) In addition to serving this battalion, the meteorological section has been providing three lO-line NATO and 9-line computer metro messages daily to the following units:

(a) 1st Battalion, 4Oth Artillery (Army)

(b) Provisional (155mm)(SP) Howitzer Battery (Marine)

(c) 1'st-8" Howitzer Battery (Marine)

(d) Combined Artillery Battalion (Army and Marine) at Gio Linh

(e) lst Battalion, 11th Marines

(f) 8th TAB, 26th Artillery (Army)

(g) 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines

(h) 30th Weather Squadron (Air Force)

(i) Marine Auxiliary Air Group 56

(j) Marine Air Base Squadron 36

(k) Naval ships firing in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone.

d. Enemy activity.

(1) The battalion came under hostile fire for the first time on 28 August when NVA artillery, in four separate attacks, fired some 90 140mm rockets and 152mm artillery rounds at the Dong Ha Combat Base. Approximately 20-25 artillery rounds hit in the vicinity of the battalion perimeter resulting in minor damage to tentage.

(2) A platoon (2 guns) of B Battery received a rocket attack on 2 September. Two 5-ton trucks were destroyed, as a result of a direct hit on one of the vehicles and a third truck was slightly damaged.

(3) A second artillery attack on the Dong Ha Combat Base on 3 September left the immediate area of the battalion untouched, but virtually destroyed the main base ammunition dump.

(4) On 9 October a 5-ton truck from A Battery, traveling in convoy from Dong Ha to Quang Tri City was heavily damaged by the side blast from a mine struck by another vehicle heading in the opposite direction. The driver and one other passenger in the A Battery vehicle were slightly injured but immediately returned to duty.

(5) On 13 October, a temporary position area occupied by a platoon of C Battery north of Quang Tri City (YD314556) was attacked with, 82mm mortars. The battery sustained no casualties or damage.

(6) On 29 October, the Dong Ha Combat Base again came under NVA artillery fire on four separate occasions with some 40-50 rounds impacting in or near positions occupied by the battalion., One 175mm gun (A Battery) was put out of action for three hours because of damage to the hydraulic lines. Two 2 ˝-ton trucks and three 3/4-ton trucks (Headquarters Battery) received moderate to light damage. In addition, the 2 ˝-ton metro van was slightly damaged, and several tents, conexes, and bunkers were struck by shell fragments. Three personnel received minor wounds from fragments and four others were injured as a result of accidents which occurred while they were running for cover.

(7) On 31 October, 15 rounds were fired at A Battery from an 82mm mortar located approximately 1000 meters north of the battery's position. Only one round is known to have impacted within the battery perimeter. One 3/4-ton truck sustained a cracked windshield.

(8) On ten other occasions throughout the period, elements of the battalion were subjected to light harassing fire from both artillery and mortars.

(9) Although North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units are known to be operating in close proximity to the Dong Ha Combat Base, no ground attacks have yet been attempted against the perimeter itself.'

3. Operations and Training Activities.

a. Plans.

(1) 3rd Marine Division OPLAN 59-67.

(2) A plan is under consideration to relocate C Battery from its present position (YD221589) to C1 (vic YD206675). in conjunction with two M-110's from the Marine 1st 8" Howitzer Battery. This move would provide an additional 10,000 meter range capability against targets in North Vietnam.

b. Operations.

(1) All elements of the battalion have been continuously engaged in Combat operations, against the enemy since their arrival in-country. Throughout this period, the battalion (-B Battery), located at Dong Ha, has been supporting the 3rd Marine Division under the operational control of the 12th Marine Regiment. B Battery, located near Da Nang, has been Supporting the 1st Marine Division under the operational control of the 11th Marine Regiment.

(2) On the morning of 15 August, B Battery moved from its staging area in Da Nang to an initial position at AT918795, approximately 4000 meters west of Red Beach. The flying elements of the battery proceeded from the Bridge Ramp in Da Nang to Red Beach by LCU, thence overland to the position area. The remainder of the battery proceeded overland from the battalion staging area southeast of Da Nang. The battery fired its first mission, a precision registration, at 1300 hours the same day.

(3) The following day, 16 August, One platoon (2 guns) from B Battery displaced to Hill 65 (AT878576), approximately 10,000 meters southwest of Da Nang.

(4) On the evening of 16 August, the firing elements of A and C Batteries departed Da Nang aboard LCU's and arrived at Dong Ha at various times between 0900 and 1600 hours the following day. A Battery occupied a position at YD208596 Which had just been vacated by B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 94th Artillery. C Battery occupied previously ur,uaed terrain at YD222590. The first mission from Dong Ha, a precision registration, was fired by A Battery at 1815 hours, 17 August. The second round of this mission resulted in large secondary explosions in the target area.

(5) Headquarters, Service, and the remainder of A and C Batteries proceeded to Dong Ha by armed convoy, arriving at 1230 hours, 18 August 1967. Headquarters and Service Batteries occupied positions at YD223587 and YD224586 respectively, adjacent to O Battery.

(6) The platoon of B Battery located on Hill 65 proved extremely difficult to support logistically because of the steep terrain on which the position was located, the poor condition of the roads leading into the area, and the relatively long distances from supporting organizations at Da Nang. Control was complicated by the inability of the Battery Commander to establish reliable communications between the two portions of the battery by either radio or land line. The situation was rectified on 23-24 September, when both elements of the battery were united in a new permanent position at AT988674.

(7) On 11 October, one platoon from C Battery displaced to YD314550 just north of. Quang Tri City in order to provide artillery coverage for a radio relay station some 30,000 meters to the south during the opening phase of Operation "Medina." The platoon was assigned a reinforcing mission in support of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, during this operation. The platoon returned to its original position at Dong Ha on 19 October.

(8) On 23 October, one platoon from B Battery displaced to AT919801 to provide support for Operation "Knox". The platoon returned to its original position on 31 October.

(9) Since arriving in Dong Ha on 1'7 August, A and C Batteries have fired 19,458 rounds in support of 3rd Marine Division operations and an additional 624 rounds in support, of ARVN forces. 14,583 of these rounds have been fired at targets in and north of the Demilitarized Zone. During the period 10 September-7 October, more than 7,000 rounds were fired against NVA forces concentrated against the Marine outposts at Con Thien and Gio Linh. C Battery alone fired 518 rounds on the 14th of September. Firing reached its peak during the first week in October when the two firing batteries at Dong Ha averaged 420 rounds per day as compared to an overall battalion average of 272 rounds per day since arrival in-country.(see Inclosure 3).

(10) Since 15 August, B Battery has fired 6,664 rounds in support of 1st Marine Division operations in the Da Nang area (see Inclosure 3). Since the NVA rocket attack on Da Nang on 2 September, the l 1 th Marines have developed and pursued an aggressive counter-battery program in which B Battery has played a prominent part. B Battery has received considerable praise for its speed and accuracy, frequently exceeding that of light artillery units in the area.

(11) It is interesting to note that of the 3064 missions fired during this period by the two batteries at Dong Ha, only 194 (6%) have been observed. Of these 194, approximately one-third have been registrations or other non-destructive missions such as "spotter rounds" for reconnaissance inserts. Similarly, only 60 of the 2124 missions (3%) fired by B Battery have been observed. Fewer than 50% of these have been against known or suspected enemy targets. Lack of aircraft for air observation has been a primary restricting factor, especially in the area of the Demilitarized Zone where ground observation is limited.

(12) Since arriving in-country, battery and battalion FDC's have continuously operated on a 24 hour a day basis. Check charts are used at both levels. The number of FDC personnel authorized by TOE is insufficient for this purpose and the battalion has been obliged to use survey and forward observer personnel to augment FDC teams. When firing batteries have split into separate platoons operating, independently, additional personnel have been provided to the battery FDC's by the battalion FDC.

c. Training.

(1) During the first 45 days in-country, training was heavily oriented toward familiarizing the individual with the policies, ground rules, and additional skills applicable to a new and unfamiliar environment. Instruction, while closely supervised, was informal in nature, and was scheduled primarily on the basis of immediate needs. The following subjects were stressed:

(a) Perimeter defense.

(b) Handling and use of the Claymore mine.

(c) Rules of engagement.

(d) Familiarization firing (and test firing) of organic small arms and crew served weapons.

(e) Artillery Safety procedures.

(f) Alert warnings and procedures.

(g) Convoy security.

(h) Maintenance of Vehicles and equipment.

(i) Section Drill (FDC)and gun sections.

(j) Communications procedures and security.

(2) A quarterly training program based on USARV Regulation Number 350-1 was published by the battalion headquarters, effective 1 October. This program provides for 168 hours of training varying between 10 and 14 hours per week. Each battery is required to publish a weekly training schedule based on these requirements. Character Guidance and weapons familiarization are scheduled monthly by the Battalion S3 section.

(3) The battalion Tactical SOP, which provides the basis of much of the Unit's training was completely revised to conform to in-country requirements on 1 October.

4. (U) Logistics.

a. General

(1) Difficulties did not occur in the shipment of equipment and supplies until arrival in-country. A large quantity of wheeled vehicles were dented and scraped while being unloaded at the deep water pier in Da Nang. However, no equipment or supplies were shipped on truck beds, therefore pilfering was not prevalent.. Several conex containers were found to have been opened, but no equipment was missing.

(2) In preparing for the movement from Da Nag, most of the cortexes were re-loaded on naval landing craft. To meet weight specifications, some conexes had to be reopened. This resulted in some mixing of equipment and attendant confusion when the conexes arrived in the position area.

b. Repair Parts.

(1) Since the battalion arrived at Dong 'Ha, the resupply of tank-automotive repair parts, other than deadline items has been slow. Less than 5% of requisitioned parts have been received. As of 31 October, 80% of authorized PLL line items were at 100% fill.

(2) PLL, with the exception of communications P, is currently being maintained at battery level.

c. Resupply of Class II.

(1) As of 31 October, less than 30% of equipment requisitioned for replacement and initial issue had been received. Important items, such as cold weather individual clothing and space heaters for living tents were as "due out". Replacement of combat loss equipment, on the other has been quite satisfactory. Three M5442 5-ton trucks have been destroyed and two were replaced within one week. As of 31 October, one replacement truck was still "due out."

(2) Experience indicates that supplies from Da Nang Sub- Area Command are frequently not received in quantities equal to those listed on issue documents. Each month, a representative from the S4 purifies the document register with records maintained at Da Nang Sub-Area Command. As of 31 October, 1 separate line items had been shipped which did not arrive in the quantities indicated. In many cases supplies are received without shipping documents. This problem has been brought to the attention of the supply facility at Da Nang Sb-Area Command.

(3) Resupply of routine items has been slow. Critical supplies such as POL and ammunition frequently tie up available transportation. In addition, harassment of river transportation and the occasional requirement to off-load and reload supplies onto smaller craft at the mouth of the Cua Viet River have caused unpredictable delay which disrupt the supply system.

d. Construction of firing pads for the eight 175mm guns located at Dong Ha began on 22 September 1967. As of 26 October, one pad was completed, two were partially completed, and earth work was prepared for another two. A Company, 3rd Engineer Battalion (Marine), is constructing the pads while materials are being provided through Army channels. A shortage of suitable materials has hampered construction and steps have been taken to decrease the size of the pads in order to conserve materials. A number of command staff visits have been made to Da Nang Sub-Area Command to procure urgently required materials. The most difficult items to obtain are 6x12 inch, 4x12 inch and 2x12 inch lumber for pad decking. A portion of the materials, such as drift pins, nails and reinforcing rods, used so far have been acquired from local sources in order to continue construction. Marine Engineers plan to complete construction of the pads on 18 November if materials are available.

e. Maintenance Support and Supply.

(1) Thirty-five elevating differentials and six traversing assemblies on the M107 failed during the period covered by this report. The problem was traced by battalion maintenance personnel to improper torque adjustments on elevating and traversing slip-clutches (normally a support maintenance function). This adjustment is now being accomplished by organizational mechanics Using locally fabricated tools and adapters.

(2) Available support maintenance is generally excellent. Generally speaking, the direct support maintenance facility at Dong Ha has an adequate stock of repair parts (third echelon)and down time for artillery and artillery vehicles has been kept at a minimum.

(3) Second echelon repair parts, however, have been in short supply in the Dong Ha area. All requisitions for such parts are submitted through a local logistics task force to Da Nang. Only three shipments of parts have been received to date. In most cases, no documents are received with supplies, thus complicating the supply accounting system.

(4) The battalion has changed 52 175mm tubes and 16 breech rings since arrival in-country.

(5). Average daily deadline status of tan-automotive equipment since arrival in-country is as follows (see Inclosure 4).

Track vehicle 3.5% Daily

Wheel Vehicle 4.5% Daily

f. Base Construction.

(l) Immediately upon arrival in position, heavy and continuing emphasis was placed on base camp construction. Construction priorities were established as follows:

(a) Base camp defensive perimeter.

(b) Immediate protection for tactical operating elements.

(c) Immediate protection far billeting and administrative facilities.

(d) Construction of permanent bunkers and emplacements for tactical operations and command elements.

(e) Construction of protected semi-permanent billeting and administrative facilities above ground.

(f) All other.

(2) With the exception of gun pads, the construction of all basic tactical, administrative, and billeting facilities has been virtually completed,

5. (U) Civil Affairs.

a. The battalion has been assigned no specific area of responsibility for civil affairs.

b. The battalion, however, assisted the 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, with a MEDCAP program in the Cam Lo area.

c. In addition, a project to establish a pig farm in the village of Thon Thie Trang has been initiated.

6. Personnel.

a. Since arriving in-country, the battalion has been attached to Headquarters 1st Field Forces Vietnam Artillery (Forward) for administration.

b. Strength:

(1) Authorized vs assigned, since arrival in-country.

 Authorized Assigned
 12 August
 31 October
Warrant Officer444
EM 524502526

(2) Gains vs losses since arrival in-country:

 Gains Losses Net gain (loss)
Officer4 (1)
Warrant Officer00 0
Enlisted 3915 24
Total4320 23

c. Casualties since arriving in-country:

Killed in action0
Died of battle wounds0
Wounded in action5(all minor wounds)
Missing in action0
Non-battle casualties1

Source: USARV Form 130-R (Casualty Report)

d. The skills of replacement personnel have not been consistent with those requisitioned. For example, requisitions were submitted for eight 13B40's in grade E5 and E6, two 31G40's (grade E5), and one 94B20 (grade E5). These requisitions were usually filled with 13A's in grade E3. At the end of the reporting period, the battalion had the following shortages in the grades and MOS's indicated:

MOSGrade  No. Short
13B40  E64
13B40  E54
31G40  E52
94B20 E51

e. The battalion submitted its first "infusion" lists, for the month of October, on 19 September 1967. To date, no notification has been received as to the disposition of these lists. However, four Lieutenants and one Captain were transferred to other Army units in this vicinity to alleviate critical shortages.

7. (U) Artillery.

a. The battalion is equipped with the 175mm gun, M107.

b. In general, this weapon has performed extremely well. Specifically its advantages are:

(1) Extremely long range (32,500 meters).

(2) Considerably greater accuracy when firing zones 2 and 3 than it is generally given credit for, provided good registration and metro data are available.

(3) Excellent mobility over rough terrains.

c. The following characteristics have proven to be disadvantages.

(1) Limited traverse. Although technically capable of traversing 533 mils left and right of the center of traverse with all zones, it has been found that the firing of zone 2 at more than 300 mils and zone 3 at more than 200 mils out of center of traverse greatly increases wear and tear on the traversing mechanism. Since the tactical situation requires coverage throughout 6400 mils, frequent relaying of guns is required (up to 14 times per day).

(2) Short tube life - Only 300 rounds at zone 3 (1666 if only zones 1 and 2 are fired). The battalion has changed tubes 52 times in 75 days.

(3) Gun pads are required if a position is to be occupied for an extended periods of time. Because of constant relaying and the shock of zone 3 firing, the ground beneath the gun deteriorates rapidly and introduces cant which the weapon cannot compensate for.

(4) Lack of armor protection for the crew and on-carriage components of the gun. Both are extremely susceptible to damage by shrapnel during hostile attack.

8. Communications.

a. The battalion communications platoon handles the requirements for expendable signal items and PLL for the entire battalion. By exercising close control, the battalion has been able to maintain an adequate stock of all critical items.

b. Close adherence to maintenance schedules and proper supervision have resulted in an extremely low turn-in rate of communications equipment for repairs.

Part A. (U) Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. Personnel.

Item: Publications.

Discussion: The battalion was in Vietnam for three weeks before necessary theater and local publications became available. Even then, the supply was limited both in quantity and applicability. The battalion S1 recently hand-carried requisitions to Headquarters, I Field Forces at Nha Trang only to find that most of the requested publications were not available and that it would take a minimum of 30 days to fill the requisitions. While an adequate library of USARV regulations was ultimately obtained for the command section (mostly by borrowing from other units), there are still none at battery level.

Observation: Provisions should be made at each level of command to insure an adequate stock of publications on hand for immediate distribution to newly arrived units.

2. Operations.

a. Item: Preparation to receive unit.

Discussion: Upon arrival in-country, the battalion advance party discovered that aside from the initial decision as to the unit's operational deployment, no advance planning existed for receiving and processing the battalion, from the time the battalion arrived in Da Nang until it deployed to its tactical area of operations, no effective liaison or coordination was ever established between the Army, Navy, and Marine headquarters involved. The unit was obliged to make its own arrangements with the various individual agencies of each service for troop quartering, equipment processing,.logistical and administrative support, and movement to areas of tactical deployment.

Observations: The arrival of a new unit in an established area of operations should be preceded by elementary planning and preparation for quartering, processing, and deployment. A single headquarters or agency should b given specific responsibility for establishing the necessary liaison and coordination 'required.

b. Item: Perimeter security.

Discussion: Under the current TO&E, a 175mm gun battalion does not have sufficient personnel to provide, over an extended period of time, the extensive perimeter security required in an active combat environment. This is especially true for a firing battery' where the major elements (gun sections and FDC) are functioning 24 hours a day.

Observation: 175 artillery battalions operating in an active combat environment should be augmented with an organic security platoon of approximately 40 men.

3. Training: None.

4. Intelligence: None.

5. Logistics.

a. Items: Gun pads.

Discussion: Because of the shock of zone 3 firing, constant shifts in direction of fire throughout 6400 mils, and frequent heavy rainfall, the ground in a 175mm firing battery position tends to deteriorate rapidly, decreasing the stability and accuracy of the weapon and increasing maintenance problems and safety hazards for the crew. Construction of a level, stable firing platform is essential if the battery is to occupy one position for any length of time. While several acceptable gun pad designs are currently in use in this area of operations, construction' materials are in extremely short supply and required engineer support is difficult to obtain.

Observation: A standard "gun pad kit” of proven design and capable of being constructed by organic battery personnel should be developed and made available to heavy artillery units in Vietnam.

b. Item: Fuel cell failures on the M107.

Discussion: Since the battalion has been in-country, fuel cells on six M107's have failed. Failure occur at the welded seam adjacent to the battery storage compartment approximately three inches to the front and rear of the number three torsion bar anchor. It is believed hat the failure occurs from continually firing zone 3. Failures have not occurred in rewelded seams. An Equipment Improvement Report (DA Form 2407) concerning this problem was submitted in October 1967.

Observations: Welded seams on the fuel cells of the M107 need to be reinforced to withstand the shock of continuous Zone 3 firing.

c. Item: Scoop loader.

Discussion: Heavy earth-moving equipment is essential for the rapid construction of bunkers and field fortifications in an active combat zone, but is often unavailable from outside sources. H90M scoop loader (organic only to 8" and 175mm artillery battalions) has been invaluable to this organization since its arrival 'in Vietnam and, on several occasions, has been utilized by other artillery units in the vicinity.

Observation: The scoop loader should be organic to all artillery units deploying to Vietnam.

6. Other.

Item: Weatherproofing of communications electronics equipment.

Discussion: The heavy rains, high humidity, and dust common to this theater of operations require that communications-electronic equipment be protected to the maximum extent possible, Weatherproofing materials are not readily available in this area. Prior to departing CONUS, the battalion was issued the new series of radios less their protective covers.

Observation: Units should be issued protective covers for electronics-communications equipment prior to departure from CONUS. If not issued, covers should be made at CONUS installations.

2. Operations: That a specific staff agency or proje ct officer at each major level of command be charged with specific responsibility for coordination and plan in preparation for a new unit.

3. Training: None.

4. Intelligence: None.

5. Logistics: Recommend that "gun pad Kits" consist:hug of pre-cut and readily assembled components be developed and stocked in-country for issue to heavy artillery, units.

6. Other: None.

LTC, Artillery
1-Organization Chart
2-Average Weekly Temperature
3-Average Rounds/Day by Week
4-Vehicle Non-availability Status
CG, I F Arty - 9